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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
An Immigration Judge (IJ) decided, and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed, that Petitioner Ayub 
Luziga is ineligible for withholding of removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention 
Against Torture (CAT) because he was convicted of a 
“particularly serious crime,” and that he is not entitled to 
deferral of removal under the CAT because he failed to carry 
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his burden of proof. Luziga requests our review, arguing that 
the IJ and BIA made two legal errors. First, Luziga argues that 
the IJ and BIA misapplied the framework for making 
particularly serious crime determinations, a framework the 
BIA itself has established in its precedential opinions. Second, 
Luziga argues that the IJ failed to observe the rule we 
articulated in Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 
2001), requiring immigration judges to notify a noncitizen in 
removal proceedings that he is expected to present 
corroborating evidence before finding that failure to present 
such evidence undermines his claim. We agree that the IJ and 
BIA erred in these respects; therefore, we will grant Luziga’s 
petition for review, vacate the underlying order, and remand.1 
I. 
Ayub Luziga, a native of Tanzania, was lawfully 
admitted to the United States as a visitor twenty years ago. He 
later applied and was approved for a student visa but eventually 
fell out of lawful status. In 2014, he was arrested and indicted 
for wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and conspiracy 
to commit the same in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The 
Government alleged that from 2007 to 2008, Luziga, his then-
wife, Annika Boas,2 and fellow Tanzanians conspired to 
“fraudulently secure residential mortgage loans funded by 
federally-insured financial institutions by causing materially 
                                              
1 The Court wishes to express its gratitude to a recent 
graduate of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Khary 
Anderson, and his supervising lawyers, Joseph Patrick Archie 
and Christopher J. Mauro of Dechert LLP, for their excellent 
pro bono representation of the Petitioner in this matter. 
2 The record indicates that Luziga and Boas were in divorce 
proceedings in October 2015. Their current marital status is not 
reflected in the record.  
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false statements to be made during the loan application and 
approval process.” Certified Administrative Record (C.A.R.) 
1026-28.  
Luziga pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and was 
sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. His conduct 
caused losses between $400,000 and $1,000,000, and he 
personally received checks totaling at least $54,863.11. He was 
ordered to pay restitution of almost $1,000,000. 
Luziga cooperated in the investigation of his co-
conspirators and testified against his wife, who was convicted 
and sentenced to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment. While 
Luziga prepared to testify, prosecutors asked him about the 
location of Mrisho Nzese, who had been convicted for his role 
in the conspiracy but fled the country. They also wanted Luziga 
to ask his stepfather, a police commissioner and the chief of 
INTERPOL in East Africa, to help return Nzese to the United 
States. News of the investigation and Luziga’s cooperation 
with prosecutors spread through the Tanzanian community in 
the United States and abroad. 
While Luziga was serving his sentence, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) ordered him removed by final 
administrative order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b). However, 
because Luziga expressed a reasonable fear of returning to 
Tanzania, DHS referred him to the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) for removal proceedings, where 
he requested withholding of removal under the INA and the 
CAT, and deferral of removal under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. 
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§ 208.31. At Luziga’s individual hearing,3 the IJ heard part of 
his testimony before deciding that his conspiracy conviction 
was a conviction for a particularly serious crime, making him 
ineligible for withholding of removal under the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), and the CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). 
The IJ allowed the hearing to proceed on the issue of deferral 
of removal under the CAT. 
In support of his request for deferral of removal, Luziga 
explained that he feared torture and testified that his parents-
in-law threatened to “make sure that [he] suffer[s]” in Tanzania 
and said he “would never even survive a day in Africa.” C.A.R. 
472-73. Luziga understood this to mean that they would kill 
him. Nzese, the co-conspirator who had fled the United States, 
made similar threats. Luziga learned of Nzese’s threats from 
two sources. First, he received a letter from a friend reporting 
that “the other guy who went [to Tanzania],” who Luziga 
believed to be Nzese, blamed Luziga for trying to bring him 
back to the United States. C.A.R. 509-10, 974. Second, a friend 
of his then-wife who “[hung] out [at] a lot of parties in 
Tanzania” with Nzese, C.A.R. 501, wrote to Luziga warning 
him of Nzese’s threats. Annika’s friend also testified 
telephonically in support of Luziga’s request for relief from 
removal. 
Luziga testified that his parents-in-law and Nzese could 
act on threats with assistance from Tanzanian officials, or at 
least with impunity. He claimed that Nzese is the nephew of 
                                              
3 The hearing where parties are afforded the opportunity to 
make opening and closing statements, present and object to 
evidence, and present and cross-examine witnesses before an 
IJ is known as the “individual calendar hearing.” U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, Immigration 
Court Practice Manual, § 4.16 (2019).  
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Tanzania’s former president. And he believed that his father-
in-law, Nicholas Boas, knew “top level” officials through his 
work.4 C.A.R. 477. Luziga believed that another co-
conspirator’s father was a retired general. Luziga testified that, 
in his experience, connections with Tanzanian officials shield 
perpetrators of violence from criminal culpability. He 
described a time when his friend, whose grandfather was a 
member of parliament, shot a bus driver without any criminal 
consequence. Luziga feared that his parents-in-law and Nzese 
could do the same to him. Though his own stepfather occupied 
a position of prominence, Luziga feared this would not suffice 
to protect him due to his stepfather’s fragile health and waning 
influence, among other things. 
The IJ found that Luziga testified in a “forthright and 
frank fashion,” C.A.R. 445, and made no adverse credibility 
determination. In the absence of an explicit adverse credibility 
determination, we assume that the noncitizen testified credibly. 
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Luziga also presented the testimony of an expert 
witness, Professor Ned Bertz, an associate professor at the 
University of Hawaii with expertise in Tanzanian “history . . . 
encompass[ing] politics[,] culture[,] religion[,] ethnicity[,] and 
current events, as well as issues of crime [and] violence.” 
C.A.R. 521-22. Professor Bertz validated Luziga’s fears, 
testifying that in Tanzania “[p]eople with government contacts 
have the ability . . . to enact violence against other individuals 
if they so choose.” C.A.R. 530. And while Professor Bertz 
could not verify the alleged connection between Nzese and the 
                                              
4 The exact nature of Luziga’s father-in-law’s work with the 
government is unclear. Luziga testified that his father-in-law 
had a government contract and gave speeches, but he was not 
aware of the nature of these speeches.  
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former president, he confirmed that the former president was 
directly involved in the selection of the current president and 
that Nzese appeared to be an influential member of the same 
political party. 
After the close of evidence and counsel’s final remarks, 
the IJ announced her opinion and decision. She first addressed 
her particularly serious crime determination, explaining that 
Luziga’s conviction for participation in a fraud scheme that 
resulted in losses of nearly $1,000,000 constituted a 
particularly serious crime under Third Circuit precedent and 
calling Luziga’s criminal pre-sentencing report “quite 
dispositive.” C.A.R. 432-33. She accordingly found Luziga 
ineligible for withholding of removal under the INA and the 
CAT and pretermitted those applications. 
Addressing Luziga’s request for deferral of removal, the 
IJ decided that Luziga had not carried his burden of proof. She 
accepted that there had been threats against him, but 
highlighted what she saw as shortcomings in his evidence. She 
said there was “absolutely no showing whatsoever that either 
Mrisho Nzese or [Luziga]’s parents-in-law have the capacity 
somehow to cause [his] torture.” C.A.R. 446. She stated there 
was “no proof” that Luziga’s parents-in-law and Nzese had 
government connections: “[O]ther than one individual so 
opining, and [Luziga] also opining that [Nzese] is the nephew 
of the ex-president[,] . . . [t]here is no independent 
corroborative information supplied on this issue, and that 
causes the issue to fail under the burden of proof standard.” Id. 
Even assuming Luziga’s co-conspirators’ government 
connections, she found that Luziga did not satisfy his burden 
of proof on the nexus between torture and government action 
or culpable inaction because “the suggestion that the ex-
president would . . . do something unlawful to vindicate [] 
Nzese, is supported by nothing at all on the record other than 
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some opining by [the] expert . . . and [Luziga]’s own opinions 
about that”; and “there is nothing to substantiate” that Luziga’s 
parents-in-law could torture him with the acquiescence of the 
government. C.A.R. 446-47. Finally, she found that “[t]here is 
absolutely nothing to substantiate [Luziga]’s contention that 
his own stepfather . . . would be unable to protect [him].” 
C.A.R. 447. The IJ found these failures of proof dispositive of 
Luziga’s claim. 
Luziga appealed to the BIA5 and argued that the IJ erred 
in her particularly serious crime determination because, while 
precedent requires a two-step analysis, the IJ had “skipped the 
preliminary step to determine whether the elements of federal 
wire fraud bring ‘the crime into a category of particularly 
serious crimes.’” C.A.R. 28 (citing In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007)). He also argued that the IJ clearly 
erred in finding that he had failed to present corroborating 
evidence, erroneously required corroborating evidence when 
he had credibly testified to the details of his claim, and failed 
to find that additional corroborating evidence was readily 
available such that its absence could be held against him. 
The BIA agreed with the IJ and dismissed the appeal. 
To the IJ’s particularly serious crime determination, it added 
that the IJ applied the correct legal standard and that “the nature 
of [Luziga]’s crime, as measured by the elements of the 
offense, i.e., participation in a scheme to defraud victims of 
nearly $1,000,000, brings [his] crime within the range of a 
particularly serious offense” under BIA and Third Circuit 
precedent. C.A.R. 2-3. Thus, the BIA held that the IJ “properly 
considered the nature and scope of [Luziga’s] crime, the 
                                              
5 Luziga’s appeal involved several intermediate steps, which 
are not relevant to our review of the issues presented in the 
petition.  
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sentence imposed, and the circumstances and underlying facts” 
in making that determination. C.A.R. 3. Luziga timely filed a 
petition for review with this Court.  
II.  
The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). 
We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252. Noncitizens petition for review “with the court 
of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration 
judge completed the proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2). In 
this case, the IJ entered her appearance over proceedings in 
York, Pennsylvania from Arlington, Virginia. A panel of this 
Court previously noted that venue is proper where an IJ sitting 
outside our Circuit appears by video conference within our 
Circuit. See Angus v. Att’y Gen., 675 F. App’x 193, 196 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (addressing venue where the IJ conducted a hearing 
in York by video conference from Arlington and explaining 
that venue under §1252(b)(2) is “non-jurisdictional”) (quoting 
Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
Neither party has challenged venue, which—we now hold—is 
appropriate in this Court. 
We usually review the BIA’s opinion as the agency’s 
“final order.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 
2005).6 However, “[w]hen, as here, the BIA affirms an IJ’s 
decision and adds analysis of its own, we review both the IJ’s 
and the BIA’s decisions,” Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 408, 
411 (3d Cir. 2012), referring to the BIA’s opinion “generally” 
and to the IJ’s opinion “when necessary.” Quao Lin Dong v. 
Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 229 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).   
                                              
6 The “agency” is the EOIR, an agency within the 
Department of Justice that includes the BIA, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.0(a), and immigration courts, id. § 1003.9(a).   
 10 
Our review is restricted by statute. Pursuant to the 
administrative exhaustion requirement, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), 
a petitioner may present an issue to this Court only if he or she 
has “first raise[d] [it] before the BIA or the IJ.” Joseph v. Att’y 
Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006). While we prefer that a 
petitioner unambiguously articulates his argument to the 
agency, our exhaustion policy is liberal: if the petitioner 
“makes some effort, however insufficient,” that puts the 
agency on notice of a straightforward issue, the requirement is 
satisfied. Id. (quoting Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 
422 (3d Cir. 2005)). We are further limited by the prohibition 
against review of final removal orders for noncitizens 
convicted of aggravated felonies, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), 
and the prohibition against review of matters entrusted to the 
Attorney General’s discretion, id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).7  
We have jurisdiction to review constitutional and legal 
questions, id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), such as “[w]hether an IJ applied 
the correct legal standard.” Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 
103 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129, 
135 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We have jurisdiction to review claims that 
the [BIA] misapplied its precedents.”). We review legal 
questions and the application of law to fact de novo with 
appropriate deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of 
the INA. Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
                                              
7 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only prohibits our review of 
matters specifically delegated to the Attorney General’s 
discretion. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 251 (2010) 
(explaining the correct interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) in 
light of “the presumption favoring judicial review of 
administrative action”); see also Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 
F.3d 185, 195 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).8 If, upon review, we “take 
issue with the application of law” to the case, “we will defer to 
the authority granted an agency by Congress and remand . . . 
for the appropriate consideration.” Quao Lin Dong, 638 F.3d 
at 228.  
III. 
A. Withholding of Removal and Particularly Serious Crime 
Determinations  
Luziga’s first challenge to the agency’s final order is 
that the IJ and BIA erred in deciding that his conviction for 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud is a conviction for a 
“particularly serious crime,” making him ineligible for 
withholding of removal.  
Withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief 
that prevents removal of a noncitizen to a country where that 
individual’s life or freedom would be threatened because of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 
Ghebrehiwot v. Att’y Gen., 467 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Withholding of removal is also available under the CAT for 
those who establish that it is more likely than not that they will 
be tortured if removed. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). A noncitizen 
seeking relief under the CAT does not need to connect the 
prospect of torture with “any protected status,” such as race, 
religion, or a particular social group. Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y 
Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007).  
                                              
8 We owe deference to the BIA only when it acts “in the 
exercise of congressionally-delegated authority to make rules 
carrying the force of law,” meaning “unpublished, single-
member BIA decisions are not entitled to Chevron deference.” 
Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  
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Withholding of removal, though generally mandatory 
for those who meet the criteria, is not available to individuals 
who have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). An 
aggravated felony is a particularly serious crime per se if it 
resulted in a “term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). For other offenses, the Attorney 
General, or the BIA in its exercise of delegated adjudicatory 
authority, Kucana, 558 U.S. at 239, decides whether an offense 
is particularly serious. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).9 
Though § 1231(b)(3)(B) directs immigration 
adjudicators to decide whether an offense is particularly 
serious, the INA is “silent” about how the determination should 
be made. Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 2001). In 
the BIA’s first attempt at filling this gap, it stated that “an exact 
definition of a ‘particularly serious crime’” could not be given. 
Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982). 
However, it provided general guidance: sometimes offenses 
are or are not “particularly serious crimes” on their face, but 
most of the time the determination is made on a “case-by-case” 
basis, taking into consideration “such factors as [1] the nature 
of the conviction, [2] the circumstances and underlying facts 
                                              
9 Particularly serious crime determinations are not among 
the matters specifically delegated to the Attorney General’s 
discretion, and therefore we review them de novo. Denis v. 
Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 214 n.18 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Alaka, 
456 F.3d at 101–02). We had previously held that only 
aggravated felonies could be particularly serious crimes. 
Alaka, 456 F.3d at 104-05. We recently reconsidered that 
holding as a full court. Bastardo-Vale v. Att’y Gen., No. 17-
2017 (3d Cir. Aug. 12, 2019) (en banc). Luziga concedes that 
his conspiracy conviction is an aggravated felony.  
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of the conviction, [3] the type of sentence imposed, and, most 
importantly, [4] whether the type and circumstances of the 
crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the 
community.” Id. Over time, the Frentescu factors evolved: the 
BIA eliminated the “separate determination to address whether 
the alien is a danger to the community,” In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007) (citing Matter of Carballe, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986)), and moved away from 
focusing on the sentence imposed as a “dominant factor” in the 
determination. Id. at 343.10  
Then, in N-A-M-, the BIA incorporated the Frentescu 
factors into a two-step analysis and articulated the current legal 
standard for particularly serious crime determinations. First, 
adjudicators consider whether the elements of an offense 
“potentially bring the crime into a category of particularly 
serious crimes.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342.11 If not, then “the 
individual facts and circumstances of the offense are of no 
consequence, and the alien would not be barred from a grant of 
withholding of removal.” Id. at 342. If, however, the elements 
                                              
10 Though Frentescu was rendered inapplicable in many 
cases when Congress amended the INA in 1990 and linked 
particularly serious crimes to aggravated felonies, id. at 339-
40, the BIA eventually “revived the Frentescu case-by-case 
analysis,” Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1347 
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing In re L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649 
(B.I.A. 1999) (en banc)), after intervening legislation restored 
some of the Attorney General’s discretion. For a thoughtful 
review of this history, see L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 649-51.  
11 In N-A-M-, the BIA also reasserted that adjudicators may 
make particularly serious crime determinations solely on the 
elements of a crime. Id. at 342-43. Elements-only 
determinations are outside the scope of this case.  
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do “potentially bring the offense within the ambit of a 
particularly serious crime,” then an adjudicator may make the 
determination by considering “all reliable information[,] . . . 
including the conviction records and sentencing information, 
as well as other information outside the confines of a record of 
conviction.” Id. 
Before N-A-M-, we deferred to the Frentescu analysis 
because it was reasonable. Chong, 264 F.3d at 388 (holding 
that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1231(b)(3)(B) “guides and 
channels the Attorney General’s discretion[,] . . . thereby 
helping to ensure that the Attorney General does not make [the 
‘particularly serious crime’] determination in an arbitrary or 
inconsistent manner”) (citing L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 651 
(holding “[w]e will . . . employ Frentescu” for aggravated 
felonies with a sentence of fewer than five years)). Then, we 
deferred to the analysis announced in N-A-M-. Denis v. Att’y 
Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that N-A-M- 
“provided more clarity as to the evidence that may be 
considered in deciding whether an offense is particularly 
serious”).  
Luziga, like the noncitizen in Denis, committed an 
aggravated felony that was not a particularly serious crime per 
se. The IJ and BIA therefore had to decide whether he had 
committed a particularly serious crime. Luziga argues that the 
IJ and BIA failed to correctly apply the analysis articulated in 
N-A-M-, skipping right over the preliminary consideration of 
elements. He is correct: the agency should have applied the N-
A-M- analysis, but from the record it is clear that both the IJ 
and BIA failed to apply N-A-M- correctly.  
The BIA began its particularly serious crime analysis by 
approving of the IJ’s application of the “proper legal standard.” 
C.A.R. 2. However, when the IJ made the particularly serious 
crime determination, she failed to first consider the elements 
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of Luziga’s offense. In her preliminary determination, she 
focused on the loss amount of up to $1,000,000, found our 
decision in Kaplun v. Attorney General controlling,12 and 
announced that Luziga would be barred from withholding of 
removal. When the IJ addressed the particularly serious crime 
determination for a second time in her opinion, she explained 
that the case “clearly [fell] under the rubric of [Kaplun],” 
emphasized her reliance on the facts and circumstances in the 
pre-sentencing report and plea agreement, and found that 
Luziga’s participation in the conspiracy involved not only 
monetary loss, but also identity theft. C.A.R. 432-35. She made 
no reference to the elements of Luziga’s offense, that is “(1) 
two or more persons entered the unlawful agreement charged 
in the Superseding Indictment [the conspiracy]; and (2) 
[Luziga] knowingly and willfully became a member of that 
conspiracy.” C.A.R. 197 (Luziga Plea Agreement). To the 
extent that the BIA decided that the IJ correctly applied the 
                                              
12 In Kaplun v. Attorney General, which was decided before 
we approved of the N-A-M- framework, we found no error in 
the BIA’s determination that the noncitizen’s securities fraud 
conviction with losses of almost $900,000 constituted a 
particularly serious crime. 602 F.3d 260, 267-68 (3d Cir. 
2010). The Attorney General argues that, by citing Kaplun, the 
agency performed the first step in N-A-M-. However, mere 
citation to Kaplun is insufficient for us to draw that inference, 
and we are not at liberty to “supply the basis for [an agency] 
decision where appropriate reasons are not set forth by the 
administrative agency itself.” Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 
260, 271 (3d Cir. 2005). Moreover, our decision in Kaplun 
does not dictate that aggravated felony financial crimes must 
potentially fall within the ambit of particularly serious crimes.  
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proper legal standard for the particularly serious crime 
determination, it erred.  
The BIA’s added analysis did not fix this error. Though 
it cited N-A-M- and even stated that it would consider the 
“elements” of Luziga’s offense, the BIA listed as “elements” 
specific offense characteristics such as loss amount. C.A.R. 2-
3 (“[T]he nature of the applicant’s crime, as measured by the 
elements of the offense, i.e., participation in a scheme to 
defraud victims of nearly $1,000,000, brings the applicant’s 
crime within the range of a particularly serious offense.”). That 
is, rather than considering the elements of conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud, the BIA described a hybrid of the elements 
and facts of Luziga’s conviction. The BIA’s failure to correctly 
apply its own precedent for the particularly serious crime 
determination, to which we have consistently deferred, 
requires remand for “appropriate consideration.” Quao Lin 
Dong, 638 F.3d at 228.  On remand, the agency should first 
determine whether the elements of Luziga’s offense potentially 
fall within the ambit of a particularly serious crime. Only then 
may it proceed to consider the facts and circumstances 
particular to Luziga’s case.  
B. Deferral of Removal and Corroboration Determinations  
Luziga’s second challenge to the agency’s final order is 
that the IJ failed to notify him that he was expected to present 
corroborating evidence regarding the likelihood that he would 
be tortured in Tanzania before she denied his request for CAT 
deferral.   
Deferral of removal under the CAT is a last-resort form 
of relief that is “like an injunction” in that, “for the time being, 
it prevents the government from removing the person in 
question, but it can be revisited if circumstances change.” 
Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013). It does 
not give a noncitizen any legal status and it can be terminated 
 17 
at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17. But for removable noncitizens 
facing a likelihood of torture and no other avenues of relief, it’s 
better than nothing.  
To demonstrate entitlement to this form of relief, a 
noncitizen must prove that there is a greater likelihood than not 
that he will be tortured in the country to which he will be 
removed, id., “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). “Acquiescence” of an 
official is defined as when a “public official, prior to the 
activity constituting torture, [has] awareness of such activity 
and thereafter breach[es] his or her legal responsibility to 
intervene to prevent such activity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(7). It is not 
limited to situations where officials have “actual knowledge” 
of torture but includes “willful blindness.” Silva-Rengifo, 473 
F.3d at 65, 68 (citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194 
(9th Cir. 2003)).  
As with asylum or withholding of removal, noncitizens 
seeking deferral of removal bear the burden of proof. Mulanga 
v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 133 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17. A 
noncitizen may carry his burden with credible testimony alone. 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). However, corroborating evidence 
may be required when it is reasonable to expect it, such as for 
“facts [that] are central” to a claim and easily verified. Chukwu 
v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007). Before 
requiring corroborating evidence, i.e., deciding that “failure to 
corroborate undermines” a claim, an IJ must follow the 
Abdulai inquiry. Saravia v. Att’y Gen., 905 F.3d 729, 736 (3d 
Cir. 2018). The inquiry demands that an IJ requiring 
corroboration first:  
(1) [identify] . . . the facts for which ‘it is 
reasonable to expect corroboration;’ (2) [inquire] 
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as to whether the applicant has provided 
information corroborating the relevant facts; 
and, if he or she has not, (3) [analyze] whether 
the applicant has adequately explained his or her 
failure to do so. 
Id. (citing Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 
2001)). Where an IJ fails to “develop [a noncitizen applicant’s 
testimony] in accord with the Abdulai steps” and “hold[s] the 
lack of corroboration against [the] applicant,” we vacate and 
remand. Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192. We strictly enforce this rule. 
For example, in Saravia we remanded for a new determination 
where the IJ asked the noncitizen “why he had not submitted 
corroborating evidence,” instead of asking “whether he could 
not corroborate his testimony” and providing an opportunity to 
do so. 905 F.3d at 738–39.  
Luziga argues that he never received notice or an 
opportunity to provide corroborating evidence before the IJ 
faulted him for failing to corroborate his CAT deferral claim.13 
Before we address the merits of his argument, we must first 
address whether Luziga adequately exhausted the issue to 
permit our review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  
Before the BIA, Luziga argued that the IJ failed to find 
that corroborating evidence beyond what he had provided was 
“readily available” such that failure to produce it could be held 
against him. C.A.R. 43. He also questioned the correctness of 
                                              
13 Luziga also argues that the IJ overlooked corroborating 
evidence he did provide. Overlooking corroborating evidence 
in the record is an error at step two of the Abdulai inquiry. 
Because we will remand for a new corroboration 
determination, the IJ will have an opportunity to address any 
corroborating evidence already in the record.     
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the IJ’s corroboration findings, calling them “clearly 
erroneous.” C.A.R. 39-40. Under our liberal exhaustion policy, 
see Yan Lan Wu, 393 F.3d at 422, this is adequate. Luziga was 
not required to unambiguously raise the IJ’s failure to follow 
the three steps of the Abdulai inquiry as long as he “place[d] 
the Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on 
appeal.” Id. In questioning the correctness of the IJ’s 
corroboration determination, Luziga put the BIA on notice of 
an error in that determination.  
The BIA agreed with the IJ’s decision on Luziga’s CAT 
deferral claim without adding analysis, so we review the IJ’s 
decision. Zhang, 405 F.3d at 155. The record clearly shows that 
the IJ did not perform the Abdulai inquiry before announcing 
her decision.14 She never asked Luziga whether he could 
provide further corroborating evidence of his claim, or, if he 
could not, whether he had an explanation for his inability to do 
so. This error requires remand for a new corroboration 
determination, see Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2006), unless, as the Attorney General argues, 
“corroboration was not determinative [of] [Luziga’s] CAT 
claim,” Respondent’s Br. 31.  
In her opinion, the IJ held that Luziga failed to carry his 
burden of proof to demonstrate entitlement to CAT deferral, 
saying that Luziga had “not met his burden of proof of 
establishing the elements of his claim.” C.A.R. 446. The IJ then 
pointed to Luziga’s failure to provide corroborating evidence, 
remarking that “[a]s far as Mrisho Nzese is concerned, there is 
                                              
14 DHS counsel asked several questions about corroboration 
during proceedings. However, it is the adjudicator’s duty to 
address corroboration by going through the Abdulai inquiry if 
she plans to find corroboration determinative. See Chukwu, 
484 F.3d at 192.  
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no proof other than one individual so opining, and [Luziga] 
also opining that he is the nephew of the ex-president[;] [t]here 
is no independent corroborative information supplied on this 
issue, and that causes the issue to fail under the burden of proof 
standard.” Id. (emphasis added). And further, “[w]ith respect 
to the suggestion that the ex-president would, even if he is 
related to Mrisho Nzese, do something unlawful to vindicate 
Mrisho Nzese, is supported by nothing at all on the record other 
than some opining by this expert . . . and [Luziga]’s own 
opinions about that.” Id. The IJ also stated that there was no 
evidence corroborating Luziga’s testimony that his friend shot 
a bus driver, his stepfather couldn’t protect him, and his 
parents-in-law and Nzese could torture him with the 
acquiescence of public officials. 
The Attorney General argues that, though the IJ 
discussed corroboration, she ultimately denied Luziga’s 
request for deferral because of his failure to satisfy the “burden 
of persuasion.”15 The Attorney General asserts that the IJ noted 
the facts Luziga failed to corroborate, but ultimately accepted 
those facts for purposes of argument and was nevertheless 
unpersuaded that Tanzanian officials would acquiesce in 
Luziga’s torture.  
We are unconvinced. The IJ emphasized Luziga’s 
failure to corroborate throughout her opinion, and while she 
indicated that she would assume that Luziga had been 
threatened and that Nzese is in fact the nephew of the former 
president, she explained that, even assuming those facts, 
Luziga had failed to carry his burden of proof on the nexus 
between the possibility that his feared assailants would torture 
                                              




him and government acquiescence. C.A.R. 447-48 (explaining 
that CAT relief requires acquiescence of a public official, and 
deciding “[t]here is absolutely, completely[,] no evidence of 
this at all”). The rub is that Luziga credibly testified that 
Tanzanian officials acquiesce in harm perpetrated by people 
with government connections, particularly when he testified 
about his friend shooting a bus driver with impunity because 
his grandfather had been a member of parliament. Moreover, 
he provided an expert who testified to the same effect based on 
his study of Tanzanian history and society. See C.A.R. 530 
(“People with government contacts have the ability, 
essentially, to enact plans, to enact violence against other 
individuals if they so choose.”). Thus, a failure to prove 
acquiescence must not have been due to a lack of credible 
testimony on the issue. And if Luziga’s failure on the burden 
of proof was not due to a lack of credible testimony, the only 
other possibility is that the IJ found Luziga failed to produce 
corroborating evidence.   
There is nothing inherently wrong with that—IJs may 
require corroboration of central aspects of a claim that can be 
easily verified or demand an explanation for the absence of 
reasonably available corroborating evidence. Chukwu, 484 
F.3d at 192.  In fact, we have observed that we “typically” see 
the Abdulai inquiry “come[] into play” in just this type of 
situation: where the “petitioner has testified, apparently 
credibly, about the facts giving rise to [his] claim, but the IJ 
believes it would be ‘reasonable’ for [him] to have 
corroboration of one or more facts, such that [the IJ] imposes 
an obligation on [him] to produce corroboration in order to 
meet [his] burden.” Quao Lin Dong, 638 F.3d at 231. The 
demand is not the problem; what we prohibit is failing to notify 
the noncitizen of an unspoken expectation and then penalizing 
him for failing to meet it. The IJ held Luziga’s failure to 
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produce corroborating evidence against him without first 
giving him notice and an opportunity to provide the evidence 
or explain its absence, as Abdulai requires. That is precisely the 
kind of “‘gotcha’ conclusion[]” that led this Court to vacate 
and remand in Saravia. 905 F.3d at 738-39. Therefore, we must 
remand for a new corroboration determination.   
IV. 
In light of the foregoing errors, we will grant Luziga’s 
petition for review, vacate the underlying order, and remand 
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
